




POLITECNICO
MILANO 1863

A fault-injection methodology for the system-level reliability analysis of computing systems modeled in SystemC

Antonio Miele – antonio.miele@polimi.it

Motivations

- Widespread adoption of complex computing systems (e.g. multi-cores) in mission-/safety-critical applications




Images downloaded from google

Motivations

- Widespread adoption of complex computing systems (e.g. multi-cores) in mission-/safety-critical applications
- Necessity to perform a reliability-aware design of computing systems




Images downloaded from google



Motivations

- Widespread adoption of complex computing systems (e.g. multi-cores) in mission-/safety-critical applications
- Necessity to perform a reliability-aware design of computing systems
- Fault injection is the common tool used for reliability analysis




Images downloaded from google

Motivations

Limitations in common practices for fault injection:

- Performing fault injection only in the late design stages



Images downloaded from google

Motivations

Limitations in common practices for fault injection:


- Performing fault injection only in the late design stages
- Analyzing manly final results



Motivations

Limitations in common practices for fault injection:

- Performing fault injection only in the late design stages
- Analyzing mainly final results
- When performing monitoring on internal memory elements, analyzing raw traces



Goal of the work


A framework and a methodology for **system-level fault-injection-based reliability analysis** in multi-cores specified in SystemC/TLM

Key points:


- Support for an accurate definition of the fault campaign
- Capability to perform error monitoring at both architecture and application level
- Customizable error analysis and classification approach

Reference system

- The hardware is composed of one or various processors and HW modules
- The application is organized into tasks/functions
- Tasks are mapped on the various units




Background: ReSP




ReSP is a system-level simulation platform for multicores

- HW components modeled in **SystemC/TLM**
- Features a functional model generator for microprocessors



Background: ReSP



ReSP is a system-level simulator

- **Python** offers introspection and scripting capabilities:
 - non-intrusive visibility into the components
 - Run-time composition and management of the specification

```
ReSP - test.py
File  Modifica  Visualizza  Terminale  Ajuto

v0.3.2 - Politecnico di Milano, European Space Agency
This tool is distributed under the GPL License

Type show_commands() to get the list of available commands

>>> load_architecture('architectures/test/test.py')
File architectures/test/test.py correctly loaded


>>> run_simulation()
!!!!!!!!!!!!Hello World!!!!!!!!!!!!

Program exited with value 0


SystemC: simulation stopped by user.
Real Elapsed Time (seconds):
0.01
Simulated Elapsed Time (nano-seconds):
1307.0

>>>
```

Fault injection and analysis tools in ReSP



Fault injection and analysis tools in ReSP



- The console stops the simulation, injects the fault and resumes the simulation

```
ReSP - test.py
File Modifica Visualizza Terminale Ajuto

  /\  /\  /\  /\
 /  \ /  \ /  \ /  \
/:  \/:  \/:  \/:  \
 \  / \  / \  / \  /
  \/  \/  \/  \/  \/

v0.3.2 - Politecnico di Milano, European Space Agency
This tool is distributed under the GPL License

Type show_commands() to get the list of available commands

>>> load_architecture('architectures/test/test.py')
File architectures/test/test.py correctly loaded


>>> run_simulation(500)
>>> leonProc.npc.read()
88
>>> leonProc.npc.write(84)
>>> run_simulation()
!!!!!!!!!!!!Hello World!!!!!!!!!!!!

Program exited with value 0

SystemC: simulation stopped by user.
Real Elapsed Time (seconds):
0.01
Simulated Elapsed Time (nano-seconds):
1307.0

>>> █
```

Fault injection and analysis tools in ReSP




- Saboteurs can be automatically inserted in the specification

```
SC_MODULE(saboteur) {  
  sc_in<int> in;  
  sc_in<int> out;  
  sc_in<int> fault_activate;  
  
  void work();  
  
  SC_CTOR(saboteur) {  
    SC_METHOD(work);  
    sensitive << in << fault_activate;  
  }  
}
```

```
void saboteur::work() {  
  if ( fault_activate.read()==1 ){  
    faulty_output = apply_mask(in.read());  
    out.write(faulty_output);  
  } else  
    out.write(in.read());  
  ...  
}
```




Fault injection and analysis tools in ReSP




- Processor models expose a configurable debugging interface
- Custom C++/Python functions can analyze the execution
- Application Binary Interface (ABI) can be exploited to interpret raw data (in particular, on function calls/returns)

Fault injection and analysis tools in ReSP




- Probes (similar to saboteurs) can be used to analyze transmitted data
- Custom Python functions can be used to monitor the internal status of components (called every scheduler delta cycle)


System-level reliability analysis methodology



System-level reliability analysis methodology



- A binary analysis extracts a static characterization of the application



System-level reliability analysis methodology


application
source code

architecture
specification

Function	Memory addresses	Parameters			
		Name	Position	Type	Location
main	0x1498 – 0x1640				
rgb2gray	0xea0 – 0xf64	inputImg	0	char* (dim = 17,280)	reg0
		outputImg	1	char* (dim = 5760)	reg1
		width	2	unsigned	reg2
		height	3	unsigned	reg3
edgeDetector	0xf68 – 0x12fc	inputImg	0	char* (dim = 5760)	reg0
		outputImg	1	char* (dim = 5760)	reg1
		width	2	unsigned	reg2
		height	3	unsigned	reg3
edgeOverlapping	0x1300 – 0x1480	inputImg	0	char* (dim = 17,280)	reg0
		edgeImg	1	char* (dim = 5760)	reg1
		outputImg	2	char* (dim = 17,280)	reg2
		width	3	unsigned	reg3
		height	4	unsigned	SP + 0x0
readBitmap	HW	inputImg	0	char* (dim = 17,280)	reg0
		width	1	unsigned	reg1
		height	2	unsigned	reg2
writeBitmap	HW	outputImg	0	char* (dim = 17,280)	reg0
		width	1	unsigned	reg1
		height	2	unsigned	reg2


↓
dependability report

System-level reliability analysis methodology




- A semi-automated analysis of components' SystemC specification
 - Identifies injection locations, and
 - Supports the definition of fault models

System-level reliability analysis methodology




- A fault-free run is performed to characterize the golden execution
 - At architecture level:
 - Collect relevant traces
 - At application level:
 - Execution flow graph


System-level reliability analysis methodology



Execution flow graph




System-level reliability analysis methodology




- Fault list is defined according to
 - The liveness analysis on raw traces
-
- The diagram shows a timing diagram for a register labeled 'REG1' over 'time'. The register is initially in a 'dead' state. A sequence of operations is shown: 'write', 'read', 'read', 'write', and 'read'. Red lightning bolts indicate faults occurring during the first and third 'read' operations.

- The function to corrupt


System-level reliability analysis methodology



- Definition of custom architecture/application-level monitoring and classification functionalities in C++/Python




System-level reliability analysis methodology




- Definition of custom architecture/application-level monitoring and classification functionalities in C++/Python

- Example of classifier for the edge detection application




System-level reliability analysis methodology




- Pretty standard execution flow of the fault injection campaign
- “Reacher” results allow more in-depth analysis
- Analysis results may provide a feedback for a refinement of the classification strategy

A case study



- Reliability analysis of a thread-level TMR edge detector running onto a multicore


A case study




- First analysis performed on the main results
- Classification:
 - No effect
 - Errors
 - Exception/timeout

Class	Memory (%)	RB0-RB1 (%)	RB2-RB3 (%)	Link Reg. (%)	SP Reg. (%)	PC Reg. (%)
No effect	92.7	35.2	79.9	22.0	30.6	22.5
Errors	2.0	30.2	7.7	0	1.4	2
Exc./T.O.	5.3	34.6	12.4	78	68	75.5


A case study




- Second more-accurate analysis performed on the application-level error propagation
- E.g.: propagation of data errors



A case study



- Second more-accurate analysis performed on the application-level error propagation
- E.g.: propagation of PC errors



Conclusions

The various aspects of the methodology have been presented in three scientific papers:

- A. Miele: **A fault-injection methodology for the system-level dependability analysis of multiprocessor embedded systems**. In Journal of Microprocessors and Microsystems, Elsevier, August 2014
- G. Beltrame, C. Bolchini, A. Miele: **Multi-level Fault Modeling for Transaction-level Specifications**. In Proc. of (GLSVLSI), 2009
- C. Bolchini, A. Miele, D. Sciuto: **Fault Models and Injection Strategies in System C Specifications**. In Proc. of IEEE Euromicro DSD, 2008

Thank you...



... questions?

Contact: antonio.miele@polimi.it